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Exploiting theoretical implications for saving motives under uncertainty 
proposed by Epstein (1980), this paper empirically examines which motive 
is more dominant in aggregate household savings in Japan, precautionary 
savings or savings as waiting options. The former motive is driven by the
magnitude of risks, while the latter is promoted by the subsequent resolution
of uncertainty. Empirical results indicate that saving behavior since the
1980s is more consistent with precautionary savings; however, estimation
results from the behavior during the 1990s offer some evidence in favor of
savings as waiting options.
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Savings are determined according to various kinds of motives. In an environment
without any uncertainty, on the one hand, savings are made mainly on the basis of
intertemporal motives. Such motives are based on not only dynamic optimization
within a single generation, but also among different generations. Intertemporal
motives are sometimes restricted by liquidity positions or borrowing constraints. In
an uncertain environment, on the other hand, precautionary motives are most likely
to affect savings. That is, consumers may save in preparation for risky events, thereby
transferring current resources over time to stabilize future consumption.
Another saving motive under uncertainty, not explored extensively in existing
empirical literature of household behavior, is an option to wait for uncertainty to be
resolved. With this motive, savings are regarded as a flexible choice for the future, 
while consumption is treated as a firm commitment to current expenditures or a 
perfectly irreversible decision. In a casual argument about saving behavior, such 
waiting options are often confused with a precautionary motive. Suppose that one said
that a saving ratio went up in response to growing anxiety about future income. Would
this statement imply precautionary savings or savings as waiting options?
According to Epstein (1980), however, these two types of motives are rigorously
differentiated from each other within a simple three-period framework. Precautionary
savings are enhanced by the magnitude of risks, while savings as waiting options are
promoted by the extent to which uncertainty is resolved over time. Under the prefer-
ence with constant relative risk aversion, the former motive is more dominant among
consumers with stronger income effects, while the latter is more prominent among
those with stronger price effects.
One main reason for little interest in a saving motive as waiting options in existing
literature is that it is rather difficult to capture the latter motive in a multi-period 
context in a systematic manner, although this motive can be regarded in principle 
as the effect of expected changes in conditional volatility as the measurement of the 
subsequent resolution of uncertainty. This analytical difficulty contrasts sharply with
the easiness with which a precautionary saving motive can be treated as the effect of 
current levels of conditional volatility.
Given the above analytical difficulty in differentiating these two types of motives in
a dynamic context, this paper attempts to empirically explore broad implications 
available from the three-period model proposed by Epstein (1980), thereby examining
which motive is more dominant in determining the aggregate saving among Japanese
households, precautionary motives or waiting options. More concretely, we empirically
test how the aggregate saving ratio is responsive to either the magnitude of risks or the
subsequent resolution of uncertainty. If estimation results indicate that the saving ratio
is increasing in levels of risks, then a precautionary motive is regarded as a dominant
factor. On the other hand, a saving motive as waiting options is considered as a 
significant factor in the following empirical cases. The saving ratio is increasing when
risks are currently increasing and uncertainty is expected to be resolved subsequently.
Conversely, the ratio is decreasing when risks are presently decreasing and uncertainty
is being resolved.
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proposed by Epstein (1980), while Section III presents empirical specifications and
estimation results. Section IV presents our conclusions.
II. Epstein’s (1980) Model
This section briefly reviews a theoretical model constructed by Epstein (1980). There
are three periods, time 0, time 1, and time 2. A consumer endowed with u(c) as 
a preference and w0 as an initial endowment in time 0 allocates consumption c0, c1,
and c2 over these three periods. One period investment in time 0 yields a safe net
return r, while one period investment in time 1 generates a random net return z,
which is a discrete random variable with possible m realizations {z1, z2, z3, . . . , zm}.
The corresponding unconditional probability vector is defined as p
T = (p1, p2, p3,  ...  ,
pm), where pi = Pr(z = zi).
One important assumption is that the consumer receives a signal y correlated with
z in time 1. That is, the arrival of such a signal in time 1 may resolve uncertainty con-
cerning a random return z to some extent. Again, y is a discrete random variable with
possible n realizations {y1, y2, y3, . . . , yn}. The corresponding probability vector is
defined as q
T = (q1, q2, q3, . . . , qn), where qi = Pr(y = yi). The conditional probability
matrix is denoted as   = ( ij) where  ij = Pr(z = zi|y = yj). Thus,  q = p obtains.
Given the above assumptions, the consumer maximizes the following problem
with respect to savings in time 0 and time 1:
max  u(w0 − x0) +   qjmax{u(rx0 − x1) +    iju(x1zi)}, 
x0  j x1 i 
where x0 and x1 are savings in time 0 and time 1, and   is a discount factor. The 
utility function is specified as
c
1− 
u(c) = ——–,   for 0 <   and   ≠ 1, 
1 −  
or
u(c) = lnc,   for   = 1, 
where   denotes the degree of relative risk aversion.
Epstein (1980) defines that a signal y is more informative than y′ when every user
of a time-1 signal is at least as well off in making a decision based on an observation
of y as based on an observation of y′. This definition of the degree of informativeness
can be interpreted as the extent to which uncertainty is resolved in terms of expected
utility. In an extreme case where y and z are stochastically independent, a signal y
provides no information about z. Another extreme case is that y and z are perfectly
correlated with each other; that is, uncertainty is resolved perfectly in time 1.
Using the above framework, Epstein (1980) theoretically explores the effect on a
time-0 saving decision (x0) in two ways. The first experiment is to analyze the impact
of the degree of mean-preserving spreading of z on x0 under the assumption that y
3
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response to riskiness about z. The second experiment is to examine the effect of the
degree of informativeness or resolution of uncertainty on x0 under the assumption
that the degree of riskiness of z is fixed from a time-0 perspective.
1 The second case
corresponds to the saving motive in response to informativeness or subsequent 
resolution of uncertainty. Following the terminology used in the introduction, one
may call the former motive a precautionary saving motive, and the latter a saving as
an option to wait for uncertainty to be resolved subsequently.
One thing to be noticed concerning the above experiments is that the first experi-
ment explores a precautionary saving motive in the absence of savings as waiting
options, while the second examines options to wait for uncertainty to be resolved
later, fixing precautionary saving motives. Therefore, these experiments never analyze
the interaction between the two types of motives or their coexistence. As Epstein
(1980) mentions, the interaction cannot be investigated in an analytical form.
In terms of the first experiment, as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) show, if   is
larger than one, then an increase in riskiness or the degree of mean-preserving spreading
of z leads to an increase in a time-0 saving (x0), and vice versa.
2 If   is exactly equal to
one, then a time-0 saving is independent of riskiness concerning z. This theoretical
result implies that a consumer with strong income effects (  > 1) raises savings 
in response to an increase in riskiness. That is, such a consumer is motivated by 
precautionary savings.
With respect to the second experiment, on the other hand, Epstein (1980)
demonstrates that if   is less than one, then a time-0 saving is larger when y is more
informative, and vice versa. Again, if   is exactly equal to one, then a time-0 saving is
independent of the informativeness of y. This theoretical consequence indicates that
a consumer with strong price effects (  < 1) raises savings when uncertainty is
expected to be resolved subsequently.
According to the above implications, when one motive is analyzed with the other
motive fixed under the preference of constant relative risk aversion, precautionary
savings and savings as waiting options are differentiated rigorously from each other
depending on the magnitude of  . Only the logarithmic preference is free from these
two types of saving motives. The next section explores such theoretical implications
using the aggregate saving data of Japanese households.
III. Empirical Specifications and Estimation Results
A. Empirical Specifications
As mentioned in the introduction, a major obstacle of testing savings as waiting
options is that it is extremely difficult to measure precisely the extent that uncertainty
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1. More precisely,  q =  ′q′ holds under two different signals y and y′.
2. One caveat is that qualitative implications for precautionary savings differ noticeably between the saving (ratio)
specification and the consumption growth specification. Regardless of the degree of relative risk aversion  , 
consumption growth is always increasing in riskiness (often measured in terms of conditional variance), while as
discussed above, a qualitative effect of riskiness on saving (ratios) depends on  . See the appendix.is resolved over time, although as discussed in Section III.B, empirical studies of 
precautionary savings demonstrate that there are various kinds of indexes of riskiness.
Consequently, it would be next to impossible to test implications for savings as 
waiting options in a structural manner.
This study attempts to test empirically more broad implications for savings as waiting
options available from the basic model presented in the previous section. We identify
two different phases of time-series of risk indexes according to their dynamics, and 
associate these phases with either the subsequent or current resolution of uncertainty.
More concretely, as mentioned below, most risk indexes tend to exhibit cyclical
patterns, and hence the case where risk indexes are currently increasing may be
regarded as a situation in which uncertainty will be resolved subsequently, while 
the case where risk indexes are presently decreasing may be viewed as a situation in
which uncertainty is being resolved currently. Then, we consider that saving motives
as waiting options are present (absent), if savings increase (decrease) currently when
uncertainty is expected to be resolved subsequently.
According to Figure 1, for example, a precautionary saving motive is identical at
both points A and B because the magnitude of risk for each is the same. A saving
motive as waiting options, however, differs between these two points; risk indexes are
increasing at point A, and uncertainty is expected to be resolved subsequently, while
uncertainty is being resolved currently at point B. If risk indexes show cyclical 
patterns like those in Figure 1, then the two saving motives can be empirically
differentiated from each other from observing both saving behavior and a time-series
of risk indexes. In other words, we need to have both increasing and decreasing
phases of risk indexes to identify these two types of saving motives.
5
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B AFurthermore, given the implication that, as shown in the previous section, precau-
tionary savings and savings as waiting options are exclusive under the preference with
constant relative risk aversion, we expect that the response of savings to levels of risk
indexes is opposite to the response of savings to changes in risk indexes. That is, if
precautionary savings are dominant, then savings increase in levels of risk indexes,
and decrease when risk indexes are currently increasing. Conversely, if savings as 
waiting options are dominant, then savings decrease in levels of risk indexes, and
increase when risk indexes are currently increasing.
This section adopts the following empirical specification, thereby capturing the
above broad implication for saving motives:
St
L 1      — =  Riskt−1 +  k,l kRiskt−l +  — + constant term, (1)
Yt l=1 Yt
where St is a saving at time t, and Yt is a disposable income at time t. Riskt denotes 
an index of riskiness at time t, while  kRiskt designates a change in riskiness from 
k-period lagged to current indexes. The estimation below explores the following
cases: (k = 1, L = 1), (k = 1, L = 4), (k = 2, L = 1), and (k = 4, L = 1). A term 1/Yt may
capture either smooth consumption or savings as a buffer; therefore   is expected 
to be negative. In addition to these explanatory variables, we allow for seasonal 
dummies (quarterly dummies), a quadratic time trend, and time dummies associated
with increases in the consumption tax rate.
Suppose that larger Riskt implies higher risk. According to the above implication,
on the one hand,   is positive and   is negative when precautionary savings are 
dominant. On the other hand,   is negative and   is positive when savings as waiting
options are dominant.
As suggested in the previous section, however, one remark on the interpretation of
estimation results is that the theoretical exercise on which the empirical implications
rely does not explore the interaction between the two types of saving motives at 
all. Hence, the above estimation patterns indicate that either of the two motives 
is dominant; however, they do not necessarily imply that the other motive is 
completely absent.
Specifying not a saving ratio, but consumption growth as a dependent variable,
existing literature often regards a positive coefficient on levels of risk indexes as evidence
for precautionary savings. Such an empirical implication is easily available from the
preference with a constant degree of relative risk aversion  .
3 However, one important
advantage of the above saving ratio specification over the consumption growth 
specification is that the impact of levels of risk indexes on saving ratios depends on the
interaction of saving motives and the magnitude of  , and given this implication, 
the two types of saving motives can be differentiated empirically from each other. For
this reason, we explore the saving ratio specification defined as equation (1). The
appendix discusses other estimation problems associated with the consumption growth
specification in the context of risk measures we are using for estimation.
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3. See Footnote 2.B. Various Measures of Income Uncertainty
There have been various kinds of measures of income uncertainty based on both
micro and aggregate data among empirical studies of precautionary savings. Carroll
and Samwick (1998) derive measures of income uncertainty from theoretical restric-
tions using panel data of U.S. households, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, while
Kazarosian (1997) derives measures of income uncertainty from U.S. panel data, the
National Longitudinal Survey. Hahm and Steigerwald (1999) construct measures of
income uncertainty from a panel of forecasts.
Banks et al. (2001) estimate conditional variances of the income process using a
long time-series of British household data. Kantor and Fishback (1996) identify the
introduction of workers’ compensation as a device to reduce income uncertainty
using individual households surveyed for the 1917–19 Bureau of Labor Statistics
Cost-of-Living Study. Dunn (1998) derives unemployment risks from household
level data. As proxies for income uncertainty, Murata (2003) uses consumers’ 
opinions about future public pensions available from Japanese household panel data.
Carroll et al. (1999) use as measures of income uncertainty unemployment 
probabilities calculated from the Current Population Survey. Malley and Moutos
(1996) propose that an aggregate unemployment rate is a valuable measure of 
aggregate income uncertainty. Ejarque (1997) estimates conditional variances for
macroeconomic data as proxies for income uncertainty, and uses them to explore
effects of uncertainty on durable consumption.
Many studies use consumer sentiment or confidence as alternative proxies for
income uncertainty. Examples include Acemoglu and Scott (1994), Carroll et al.
(1994), and Throop (1992). Based on a method proposed by Carlson and Parkin
(1975), Ogawa (1991), Nakagawa (1998), and Doi (2001) calculate variances of real
income growth from consumer confidence surveyed for Japanese households.
Given the difficulty of obtaining long-run series of cross-sectional or panel data of
individual households in Japan, we use two different sets of proxies for income uncer-
tainty, aggregate unemployment statistics and consumer confidence surveys. The former
data include aggregate unemployment rates released by the Ministry of Public
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, and both active and new
job opening rates compiled by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. On the other
hand, the latter data are available from the consumer confidence surveys for households
compiled by the Economic and Social Research Institute of the Cabinet Office.
The above confidence surveys report the following indexes in quarterly frequency
with seasonal adjustments: (0) overall attitudes; (1) livelihoods; (2) increases in
income; (3) decreases in consumer price indexes; (4) employment environments; and
(5) willingness to purchase durable goods. The last index is available from 1982,
while the other indexes are available from 1972. Notice that the degree of riskiness is
definitely decreasing in the magnitude of indexes among the above measures except
for both aggregate unemployment rates and concerns about price levels.
As Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, all risk indexes except for aggregate unemployment
rates show clear cyclical patterns. Exploiting such time-series patterns of these measures
of income uncertainty, therefore, we may differentiate a precautionary saving motive
from saving motives as waiting options in a systematic manner.
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Percent Times
Unemployment rate (left scale)
Active opening rate (right scale)
Ratio of new job openings to applicants (right scale)
Note: Figures are seasonally adjusted.
Sources: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, 
Labour Force Survey; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Report on 
Employment Service.















Note: Figures are seasonally adjusted.
Source: Cabinet Office, Consumer Confidence Survey.C. Estimation Results 
A new system of national accounts was adopted by the United Nations in 1993. 
This system is called the 93SNA. Most governments including the Japanese govern-
ment have recently switched from the system approved in 1968 (hereafter, the
68SNA) to the 93SNA. As a result of this shift in the manner of accounting, the 
definitions of many macroeconomic variables including disposable income have been
changed substantially.
What matters in the context of our estimation procedure is that there are 
non-negligible discrepancies in time-series of aggregate saving ratios between the
68SNA and the 93SNA (Figure 4). According to the Economic and Social Research
Institute of the Cabinet Office, such discrepancies are caused mainly by the exclusion
of the depreciation of nonperforming loans (NPLs) from disposable income in the
93SNA. As shown in Figure 4, if the amount of NPL depreciation appropriated 
in the household sector is included in the 93SNA disposable income, then the 
above discrepancy narrows to some extent. Once the amount of NPL depreciation
capitalized in private financial corporations is incorporated into the 93SNA 
disposable income, the discrepancy almost disappears.
In consideration of the above shift in the manner of accounting, we have provided
for two sets of time-series of aggregate saving ratios, defined as the ratio of household
savings to disposable income. The first set is the quarterly series based on the 68SNA
9
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1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01
68SNA
93SNA
93SNA (NPL adjusted 1)
93SNA (NPL adjusted 2)
Notes: 1. Plotted figures are four-quarter moving averages.
2. “NPL adjusted 1” adds the amount of the NPL depreciation on the reconciliation
accounts of households to the 93SNA disposable income, while “NPL adjusted 2”
includes that of private financial corporations.
Source: Cabinet Office, National Accounts.for the period between the third quarter of 1983 and the first quarter of 1999. All 
six indexes of consumer sentiment are available for this period. The second set is 
the quarterly series based on the 93SNA for the period between the second quarter 
of 1991 and the first quarter of 2001; the 93SNA referential series is available only
up to 1991.
In estimating equation (1), we use seasonally non-adjusted series for saving ratios
and an inverse of disposable income, and seasonally adjusted series for risk indexes
and a difference in risk indexes. As mentioned before, differences in risk indexes 
are defined as changes to current indexes from one-quarter-lagged, two-quarter-
lagged, and four-quarter-lagged indexes. Disposable income is instrumented in an
autoregressive manner up to two quarter lags.
In addition, a set of explanatory variables includes (1) the second-, third-, and
fourth-quarter dummies to control for seasonality; (2) dummy variables associated
with increases in the consumption tax rate in April 1989 and April 1997 to control
for effects of the introduction of consumption tax increases on last-minute buying;
4
and (3) quadratic terms of time to allow for a nonlinear time trend.
The first panel of Table 1 reports estimation results for the first data set with
changes from one quarter lag as differences in risks. As shown by overidentification
tests, a choice of instrument variables is legitimate for these estimation procedures.
Overall results indicate that the saving behavior since the 1980s is more consistent
with a dominant precautionary saving motive. In terms of labor market indicators, a
decrease in job opening rates, both active and new, leads to an increase in saving
ratios in a statistically significant manner. Though less significant, higher saving
ratios are also accompanied by higher unemployment rates. Such a difference in 
statistical significance between job openings and unemployment may be attributed to
the fact that the latter indicators exhibit less cyclical patterns. Coefficients on  Riskt
are not significant at all in these cases, thereby implying the weakness of saving
motives as waiting options. As shown in the second through the fourth panels, the
above estimation results available from labor market indicators do not depend on
either the number of lags (L) or the interval length in defining  Riskt (k).
Regarding estimation results from consumer sentiment, the signs of estimated
coefficients on levels and changes in sentiment are also consistent with a dominant
precautionary saving motive; that is, except for variables of inflationary concerns, the
signs associated with levels are negative, while those with changes are positive. In 
particular, negative sentiment about labor income and the employment environment
significantly leads to an increase in saving ratios. In particular, such patterns in 
estimation are more conspicuous for the second panel (k = 1, L = 4) and the third
and fourth panels (k = 2 or 4, L = 1). What is interesting is that inflationary concerns
significantly lower saving ratios for this sample period. The above estimation results
agree with those of Nakagawa (1998) and Doi (2001) in that a precautionary motive
is dominant in determining aggregate saving ratios in Japan.
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4. More concretely, a dummy variable for the first quarter of 1989 (1997) is −1, and a dummy variable for the 
second quarter of 1989 (1997) is 1.11
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Table 1  Estimation Results of Saving Functions (1)
68SNA saving ratio, seasonally non-adjusted; sample period: 1983/III–1999/I
Risk indexes
None UR AJOR NJOR CCI-all CCI(1) CCI(2) CCI(3) CCI(4) CCI(5)
[1] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) 0.016 –0.030*** –0.023*** –0.055 –0.102 –0.234 0.143*** –0.069** 0.111
(—) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.103) (0.138) (0.148) (0.055) (0.032) (0.098)
 Risk –1 —) 0.010 –0.034 –0.015 0.020 0.116 0.066 –0.030 0.084* –0.021
(—) (0.028) (0.041) (0.030) (0.123) (0.155) (0.205) (0.067) (0.048) (0.101)
1/Y –0.352** –0.228 –0.252* –0.252* –0.343** –0.336** –0.280* –0.255* –0.286* –0.357*
(0.174) (0.140) (0.149) (0.147) (0.169) (0.162) (0.153) (0.150) (0.155) (0.182)
OI test 1.072 1.230 0.905 0.976 0.116 0.181 0.285 0.887 0.395 0.212
[0.300] [0.267] [0.342] [0.323] [0.733] [0.670] [0.593] [0.346] [0.530] [0.645]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.967 0.966 0.967 0.967 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.967 0.966 0.967
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
[2] One- to Four-Quarter-Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) 0.015 –0.035** –0.025** –0.167 –0.191 –0.362** 0.153** –0.058 0.028
(—) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.116) (0.183) (0.173) (0.071) (0.041) (0.128)
 Risk –1 —) 0.004 0.010 –0.003 0.025 0.097 –0.007 –0.043 0.085* 0.023
(—) (0.030) (0.111) (0.055) (0.145) (0.182) (0.241) (0.069) (0.049) (0.107)
 Risk –2 —) 0.034 –0.119 –0.033 0.324*** 0.258* 0.542** 0.032 –0.021 0.176**
(—) (0.027) (0.132) (0.058) (0.113) (0.152) (0.254) (0.071) (0.058) (0.089)
 Risk –3 —) –0.015 0.031 0.002 –0.128 –0.095 –0.192 –0.062 0.027 –0.067
(—) (0.033) (0.166) (0.061) (0.150) (0.192) (0.293) (0.082) (0.069) (0.100)
 Risk –4 —) 0.029 0.065 0.024 0.134 0.149 0.255 –0.034 –0.054 0.129
(—) (0.029) (0.125) (0.062) (0.132) (0.146) (0.220) (0.081) (0.051) (0.079)
1/Y –0.352** –0.248* –0.249* –0.260* –0.327** –0.284* –0.265* –0.242 –0.276* –0.327*
(0.174) (0.127) (0.148) (0.137) (0.165) (0.157) (0.156) (0.159) (0.146) (0.171)
OI test 1.072 0.590 1.441 1.087 0.026 0.046 0.450 0.864 0.261 0.013
[0.300] [0.442] [0.230] [0.297] [0.872] [0.829] [0.502] [0.352] [0.610] [0.910]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.967 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.967 0.964 0.966 0.965 0.964 0.966
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: 1. Estimation results are based on 2LS with the following instrumental variables: Risk –1,  Risk –1, 1/Y–1, 1/Y–2, 
constant terms, and dummies.
2. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while symbols ***, **, and * indicate that
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. The row labeled “OI test” reports test statistics of overidentifying restrictions, and their p-values in brackets.
4. The row labeled “first-stage regressions” reports adjusted R
2 of OLS regressions of 1/Y using instrumental 
variables, and p-values for the null hypothesis of zero coefficients in brackets.
5. The abbreviations of risk indexes indicate as follows: ratios of unemployed in the labor force as UR, active 
opening ratios as AJOR, new job openings to applicants ratio as NJOR, a consumer confidence index (overall
attitudes) as CCI-all, CCI (livelihoods) as CCI(1), CCI (increase in income) as CCI(2), CCI (decrease in consumer
price indexes) as CCI(3), CCI (employment environment) as CCI(4), and CCI (willingness to purchase durable
goods) as CCI(5).
(Continued on next page)Table 2 reports estimation results for the second data set without adjusting any
amount of NPLs. According to tests of overidentifying restrictions, the choice of
instrumental variables is appropriate. The estimation results offer some evidence for
savings as waiting options during the 1990s. With respect to both active and new job
opening rates, not levels, but changes in risks do matter in determining saving ratios in
favor of savings as waiting options. More concretely, saving ratios tend to go up with
deteriorating conditions in labor markets, and go down with improving conditions.
The estimation results from consumer sentiment, on the other hand, are similar to
those of the first data set, and more consistent with a dominant precautionary saving
motive. Negative sentiment about overall attitudes, livelihood, labor environments,
and willingness to purchase durable goods significantly leads to an increase in saving
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Table 1  (continued)
Risk indexes
None UR AJOR NJOR CCI-all CCI(1) CCI(2) CCI(3) CCI(4) CCI(5)
[3] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators from Two Quarters Earlier
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) 0.015 –0.030*** –0.023*** –0.156 –0.166 –0.314** 0.132** –0.069** 0.030
(—) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.104) (0.150) (0.152) (0.064) (0.031) (0.109)
 2Risk –1 —) 0.021 –0.019 –0.010 0.169** 0.161 0.229 0.011 0.035 0.100
—) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.084) (0.105) (0.148) (0.056) (0.040) (0.078)
1/Y –0.352** –0.229* –0.255* –0.254* –0.324* –0.304* –0.257* –0.255* –0.298* –0.350**
(0.174) (0.138) (0.148) (0.145) (0.171) (0.159) (0.151) (0.147) (0.162) (0.171)
OI test 1.072 0.981 0.895 0.958 0.139 0.169 0.637 0.751 0.305 0.104
[0.300] [0.322] [0.344] [0.328] [0.709] [0.681] [0.425] [0.386] [0.581] [0.748]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.967 0.966 0.967 0.967 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.967 0.966 0.967
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
[4] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators from Four Quarters Earlier
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) 0.014 –0.029** –0.022** –0.102 –0.153 –0.317 0.157** –0.068* 0.045
(—) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.144) (0.197) (0.195) (0.069) (0.039) (0.129)
 4Risk –1 —) 0.013 –0.008 –0.004 0.060 0.082 0.131 –0.028 0.013 0.061
(—) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.097) (0.115) (0.119) (0.042) (0.031) (0.077)
1/Y –0.352** –0.235* –0.253* –0.250* –0.338** –0.323** –0.272* –0.247* –0.303* –0.346**
(0.174) (0.137) (0.149) (0.146) (0.169) (0.158) (0.143) (0.150) (0.158) (0.166)
OI test 1.072 1.037 0.892 0.962 0.136 0.193 0.351 0.901 0.274 0.317
[0.300] [0.308] [0.345] [0.327] [0.712] [0.660] [0.553] [0.343] [0.601] [0.573]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.967
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: 1. Estimation results are based on 2LS with the following instrumental variables: Risk –1,  Risk –1, 1/Y–1, 1/Y–2, 
constant terms, and dummies.
2. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while symbols ***, **, and * indicate that
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. The row labeled “OI test” reports test statistics of overidentifying restrictions, and their p-values in brackets.
4. The row labeled “first-stage regressions” reports adjusted R
2 of OLS regressions of 1/Y using instrumental 
variables, and p-values for the null hypothesis of zero coefficients in brackets.
5. The abbreviations of risk indexes indicate as follows: ratios of unemployed in the labor force as UR, active 
opening ratios as AJOR, new job openings to applicants ratio as NJOR, a consumer confidence index (overall
attitudes) as CCI-all, CCI (livelihoods) as CCI(1), CCI (increase in income) as CCI(2), CCI (decrease in consumer
price indexes) as CCI(3), CCI (employment environment) as CCI(4), and CCI (willingness to purchase durable
goods) as CCI(5).13
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Table 2  Estimation Results of Saving Functions (2)
93SNA adjusted saving ratio, seasonally non-adjusted; sample period: 1991/II–2001/I
Risk indexes
None UR AJOR NJOR CCI-all CCI(1) CCI(2) CCI(3) CCI(4) CCI(5)
[1] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.005 –0.007 –0.010 –0.171** –0.223*** –0.214** –0.020 –0.057** –0.098*
(—) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.068) (0.084) (0.098) (0.045) (0.024) (0.056)
 Risk –1 —) 0.008 –0.090** –0.064*** 0.155* 0.167* 0.226 0.045 0.046 0.121**
(—) (0.018) (0.036) (0.022) (0.081) (0.101) (0.166) (0.048) (0.036) (0.060)
1/Y –0.857*** –0.858*** –0.904*** –0.908*** –0.890*** –0.892*** –0.903*** –0.846*** –0.909*** –0.891***
(0.138) (0.137) (0.169) (0.169) (0.159) (0.156) (0.164) (0.135) (0.173) (0.155)
OI test 0.182 0.210 0.337 0.600 0.143 0.122 0.433 0.060 0.484 0.027
[0.670] [0.647] [0.561] [0.439] [0.705] [0.727] [0.511] [0.807] [0.487] [0.869]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.988 0.988 0.990 0.990 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.988 0.990 0.988
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
[2] One- to Four-Quarter-Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.032** 0.018 –0.006 –0.224** –0.302** –0.148 –0.123** –0.046 –0.187***
(—) (0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.093) (0.121) (0.134) (0.058) (0.035) (0.070)
 Risk –1 —) –0.011 0.030 –0.012 0.223** 0.231** 0.240 0.121** 0.042 0.206***
(—) (0.017) (0.087) (0.045) (0.090) (0.107) (0.158) (0.054) (0.035) (0.062)
 Risk –2 —) 0.042*** –0.205 –0.066 0.003 0.021 –0.358** 0.102** –0.060* 0.118*
(—) (0.012) (0.138) (0.059) (0.099) (0.127) (0.155) (0.048) (0.031) (0.061 )
 Risk –3 —) 0.090*** 0.153 –0.029 0.147 0.148 0.225 0.094 0.009 0.111*
(—) (0.023) (0.124) (0.058) (0.102) (0.133) (0.176) (0.062) (0.042) (0.058)
 Risk –4 —) –0.030 –0.125 0.033 0.067 0.154 –0.127 0.115** 0.003 0.100**
(—) (0.020) (0.093) (0.059) (0.075) (0.110) (0.156) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046)
1/Y –0.857*** –0.894*** –0.884*** –0.906*** –0.910*** –0.942*** –0.859*** –0.862*** –0.902*** –0.873***
(0.138) (0.129) (0.154) (0.172) (0.167) (0.172) (0.125) (0.151) (0.159) (0.157)
OI test 0.182 0.079 1.165 0.530 0.433 0.359 1.578 0.384 0.603 0.281
[0.670] [0.778] [0.280] [0.467] [0.511] [0.549] [0.209] [0.536] [0.437] [0.596]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.988 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.988 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.989 0.987
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: 1. Estimation results are based on 2LS with the following instrumental variables: Risk –1,  kRisk –l, 1/Y–1, 1/Y–2, 
constant terms, and dummies.
2. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while symbols ***, **, and * indicate that
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. The row labeled “OI test” reports test statistics of overidentifying restrictions, and their p-values in brackets.
4. The row labeled “first-stage regressions” reports adjusted R
2 of OLS regressions of 1/Y using instrumental 
variables, and p-values for the null hypothesis of zero coefficients in brackets.
5. The abbreviations of risk indexes indicate as follows: ratios of unemployed in the labor force as UR, active 
opening ratios as AJOR, new job openings to applicants ratio as NJOR, a consumer confidence index (overall
attitudes) as CCI-all, CCI (livelihoods) as CCI(1), CCI (increase in income) as CCI(2), CCI (decrease in consumer
price indexes) as CCI(3), CCI (employment environment) as CCI(4), and CCI (willingness to purchase durable
goods) as CCI(5).
(Continued on next page)ratios. One difference from the results of the first set is that inflationary concerns do
not necessarily lead to a decrease in saving ratios.
Table 3 reports estimation results for the case where the NPL depreciation appro-
priated in the household sector is added to the 93SNA disposable income. Most
results are almost the same as those of Table 2 in terms of both overidentification
tests and estimated coefficients.
In sum, the overall saving behavior since the 1980s is more consistent with a
dominant precautionary saving motive; according to the estimation results from both
labor market statistics and consumer sentiment, levels of riskiness, not changes in risk
indexes, do matter in determining aggregate saving ratios in favor of a precautionary
motive. From more recent behavior, however, some evidence is found for savings 
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Table 2  (continued)
Risk indexes
None UR AJOR NJOR CCI-all CCI(1) CCI(2) CCI(3) CCI(4) CCI(5)
[3] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators from Two Quarters Earlier
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.012 –0.001 –0.005 –0.155* –0.207** –0.153 –0.034 –0.045* –0.108*
(—) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.079) (0.095) (0.113) (0.043) (0.027) (0.058)
 2Risk –1 —) 0.019 –0.056*** –0.041*** 0.045 0.041 –0.062 0.053 –0.009 0.082*
(—) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.065) (0.079) (0.103) (0.036) (0.024) (0.043)
1/Y –0.857*** –0.874*** –0.897*** –0.917*** –0.876*** –0.875*** –0.887*** –0.809*** –0.879*** –0.832***
(0.138) (0.144) (0.165) (0.171) (0.148) (0.148) (0.156) (0.130) (0.155) (0.128)
OI test 0.182 0.211 0.513 0.560 0.244 0.277 0.425 0.069 0.497 0.088
[0.670] [0.646] [0.474] [0.454] [0.622] [0.598] [0.514] [0.793] [0.481] [0.767]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.988 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.988 0.988 0.989 0.988 0.989 0.988
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
[4] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators from Four Quarters Earlier
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.030* 0.012 0.003 –0.228** –0.313*** –0.181 –0.120** –0.050 –0.164**
(—) (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.097) (0.117) (0.149) (0.057) (0.038) (0.065)
 4Risk –1 —) 0.023** –0.034** –0.023** 0.109 0.141 0.004 0.106*** 0.001 0.121**
(—) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.072) (0.088) (0.106) (0.038) (0.026) (0.048)
1/Y –0.857*** –0.863*** –0.913*** –0.913*** –0.900*** –0.900*** –0.891*** –0.850*** –0.885*** –0.859***
(0.138) (0.141) (0.167) (0.170) (0.159) (0.157) (0.162) (0.126) (0.163) (0.135)
OI test 0.182 0.220 0.754 0.727 0.453 0.525 0.379 0.467 0.488 0.720
[0.670] [0.639] [0.385] [0.394] [0.501] [0.469] [0.538] [0.494] [0.485] [0.396]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.988 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.989 0.988 0.989 0.988 0.989 0.988
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: 1. Estimation results are based on 2LS with the following instrumental variables: Risk –1,  kRisk –l, 1/Y–1, 1/Y–2, 
constant terms, and dummies.
2. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while symbols ***, **, and * indicate that
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. The row labeled “OI test” reports test statistics of overidentifying restrictions, and their p-values in brackets.
4. The row labeled “first-stage regressions” reports adjusted R
2 of OLS regressions of 1/Y using instrumental 
variables, and p-values for the null hypothesis of zero coefficients in brackets.
5. The abbreviations of risk indexes indicate as follows: ratios of unemployed in the labor force as UR, active 
opening ratios as AJOR, new job openings to applicants ratio as NJOR, a consumer confidence index (overall
attitudes) as CCI-all, CCI (livelihoods) as CCI(1), CCI (increase in income) as CCI(2), CCI (decrease in consumer
price indexes) as CCI(3), CCI (employment environment) as CCI(4), and CCI (willingness to purchase durable
goods) as CCI(5).15
Precautionary Motives versus Waiting Options: Evidence from Aggregate Household Saving in Japan
Table 3  Estimation Results of Saving Functions (3)
93SNA adjusted saving ratio + NPL disposition, seasonally non-adjusted; sample period: 1991/II–2001/I
Risk indexes
None UR AJOR NJOR CCI-all CCI(1) CCI(2) CCI(3) CCI(4) CCI(5)
[1] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.011 0.019 0.005 –0.253** –0.339** –0.247* –0.059 –0.074** –0.177*
(—) (0.018) (0.021) (0.015) (0.111) (0.142) (0.143) (0.063) (0.037) (0.095)
 Risk –1 —) 0.049 –0.192*** –0.146*** 0.061 0.079 –0.112 0.101 –0.045 0.120
(—) (0.030) (0.062) (0.040) (0.131) (0.170) (0.262) (0.072) (0.057) (0.085)
1/Y –0.926*** –0.922*** –0.987*** –0.991*** –0.981*** –0.979*** –0.967*** –0.908*** –0.948*** –0.978***
(0.215) (0.194) (0.211) (0.209) (0.216) (0.210) (0.225) (0.201) (0.215) (0.214)
OI test 1.109 1.606 1.586 2.434 1.400 1.451 1.583 0.603 2.050 0.941
[0.292] [0.205] [0.208] [0.119] [0.237] [0.228] [0.208] [0.437] [0.152] [0.332]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.977 0.979 0.982 0.982 0.979 0.979 0.981 0.975 0.981 0.977
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
[2] One- to Four-Quarter-Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.029 0.008 –0.015 –0.347*** –0.477*** –0.138 –0.333*** –0.047 –0.350***
(—) (0.023) (0.036) (0.027) (0.125) (0.152) (0.175) (0.069) (0.041) (0.086)
 Risk –1 —) 0.023 –0.154 –0.102 0.182 0.207 –0.120 0.290*** –0.059 0.299***
(—) (0.029) (0.110) (0.063) (0.151) (0.184) (0.295) (0.066) (0.058) (0.082)
 Risk –2 —) 0.079*** –0.198 –0.135* 0.032 0.084 –0.435* 0.272*** –0.107** 0.217***
(—) (0.018) (0.181) (0.075) (0.149) (0.175) (0.241) (0.057) (0.049) (0.079)
 Risk –3 —) 0.082** 0.225 0.018 0.264* 0.292 0.206 0.346*** –0.033 0.279***
(—) (0.037) (0.195) (0.087) (0.157) (0.187) (0.289) (0.072) (0.049) (0.074)
 Risk –4 —) –0.074** –0.050 0.112 0.076 0.174 –0.198 0.189** 0.019 0.145**
(—) (0.034) (0.146) (0.080) (0.139) (0.191) (0.293) (0.078) (0.078) (0.061)
1/Y –0.926*** –1.017*** –0.935*** –1.000*** –0.989*** –1.016*** –0.894*** –0.867*** –0.938*** –0.920***
(0.215) (0.183) (0.208) (0.216) (0.216) (0.226) (0.179) (0.151) (0.191) (0.189)
OI test 1.109 1.344 1.824 1.669 2.572 2.520 3.278 4.333 2.110 2.905
[0.292] [0.246] [0.177] [0.196] [0.109] [0.112] [0.070] [0.037] [0.146] [0.088]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.977 0.983 0.981 0.980 0.978 0.978 0.979 0.986 0.981 0.981
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: 1. Estimation results are based on 2LS with the following instrumental variables: Risk –1,  kRisk –l, 1/Y–1, 1/Y–2, 
constant terms, and dummies.
2. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while symbols ***, **, and * indicate that
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. The row labeled “OI test” reports test statistics of overidentifying restrictions, and their p-values in brackets.
4. The row labeled “first-stage regressions” reports adjusted R
2 of OLS regressions of 1/Y using instrumental 
variables, and p-values for the null hypothesis of zero coefficients in brackets.
5. The abbreviations of risk indexes indicate as follows: ratios of unemployed in the labor force as UR, active 
opening ratios as AJOR, new job openings to applicants ratio as NJOR, a consumer confidence index (overall
attitudes) as CCI-all, CCI (livelihoods) as CCI(1), CCI (increase in income) as CCI(2), CCI (decrease in consumer
price indexes) as CCI(3), CCI (employment environment) as CCI(4), and CCI (willingness to purchase durable
goods) as CCI(5).
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Table 3  (continued)
Risk indexes
None UR AJOR NJOR CCI-all CCI(1) CCI(2) CCI(3) CCI(4) CCI(5)
[3] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators from Two Quarters Earlier
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.026 0.029 0.014 –0.236** –0.328** –0.155 –0.098 –0.050 –0.196**
(—) (0.019) (0.022) (0.015) (0.118) (0.146) (0.144) (0.070) (0.037) (0.098)
 2Risk –1 —) 0.054*** –0.103*** –0.086*** –0.001 0.014 –0.266* 0.135* –0.080** 0.096
(—) (0.018) (0.036) (0.023) (0.096) (0.117) (0.161) (0.076) (0.037) (0.068)
1/Y –0.926*** –0.972*** –0.965*** –1.004*** –0.977*** –0.970*** –0.963*** –0.807*** –0.933*** –0.914***
(0.215) (0.199) (0.206) (0.218) (0.211) (0.209) (0.209) (0.172) (0.193) (0.187)
OI test 1.109 1.424 2.042 2.217 1.512 1.597 1.986 0.646 2.296 1.125
[0.292] [0.233] [0.153] [0.137] [0.219] [0.206] [0.159] [0.421] [0.130] [0.289]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.977 0.983 0.981 0.982 0.979 0.979 0.980 0.975 0.981 0.977
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
[4] Lagged Differences of Risk Indicators from Four Quarters Earlier
(Second-stage regressions)
Risk–1 —) –0.048** 0.046 0.026 –0.372*** –0.500*** –0.158 –0.323*** –0.042 –0.328***
(—) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020) (0.125) (0.151) (0.189) (0.087) (0.044) (0.088)
 4Risk –1 —) 0.041*** –0.052** –0.041** 0.150 0.198 –0.122 0.274*** –0.045 0.219***
(—) (0.015) (0.024) (0.017) (0.107) (0.137) (0.200) (0.065) (0.043) (0.062)
1/Y –0.926*** –0.934*** –0.983*** –0.989*** –0.994*** –0.991*** –0.972*** –0.906*** –0.940*** –0.929***
(0.215) (0.199) (0.208) (0.216) (0.223) (0.218) (0.218) (0.134) (0.201) (0.183)
OI test 1.109 1.372 2.320 2.374 1.899 2.102 1.608 3.369 2.080 3.209
[0.292] [0.241] [0.128] [0.123] [0.168] [0.147] [0.205] [0.066] [0.149] [0.073]
(First-stage regressions)
1/Y 0.977 0.982 0.981 0.981 0.980 0.979 0.980 0.981 0.981 0.981
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: 1. Estimation results are based on 2LS with the following instrumental variables: Risk –1,  kRisk –l, 1/Y–1, 1/Y–2, 
constant terms, and dummies.
2. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while symbols ***, **, and * indicate that
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. The row labeled “OI test” reports test statistics of overidentifying restrictions, and their p-values in brackets.
4. The row labeled “first-stage regressions” reports adjusted R
2 of OLS regressions of 1/Y using instrumental 
variables, and p-values for the null hypothesis of zero coefficients in brackets.
5. The abbreviations of risk indexes indicate as follows: ratios of unemployed in the labor force as UR, active 
opening ratios as AJOR, new job openings to applicants ratio as NJOR, a consumer confidence index (overall
attitudes) as CCI-all, CCI (livelihoods) as CCI(1), CCI (increase in income) as CCI(2), CCI (decrease in consumer
price indexes) as CCI(3), CCI (employment environment) as CCI(4), and CCI (willingness to purchase durable
goods) as CCI(5).
as waiting options; saving ratios depend on whether labor market conditions are 
deteriorating or improving.
As discussed earlier, the empirical specification adopted in this study can demon-
strate that either of the two motives is dominant, but it does not necessarily nullify
completely the other motive. Thus, the above difference and similarity in estimation
results between Table 1 and Table 2 [3] may not indicate that the saving behavior
had changed considerably from precautionary savings to savings as waiting options
between the 1980s and the 1990s, but imply that a saving motive as waiting options
was stronger in the 1990s than in the 1980s.17
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IV. Conclusion
As mentioned in the introduction, savings as waiting options are often confused 
with precautionary savings in practice, while both types of saving motives are not
necessarily differentiated rigorously from each other in theoretical models.
Accordingly, although a precautionary saving motive has been empirically examined
in depth, savings as waiting options tend to be ignored largely or treated only 
implicitly in existing literature. This paper attempts to challenge such an asymmetric
treatment between the two types of saving motives in empirical studies of 
consumption and savings.
Exploiting broad implications available from a model of savings under uncertainty
proposed by Epstein (1980), this paper empirically examines which motive is more
dominant in aggregate household savings in Japan, precautionary savings or savings
as waiting options. In particular, it bases the empirical specification on the following
broad implication: the former motive is driven by the magnitude of risks, while the
latter is promoted by the subsequent resolution of uncertainty. Empirical results 
indicate that the saving behavior since the 1980s is more consistent with dominant
precautionary savings; however, estimation results from the behavior during the
1990s offer some evidence in favor of savings as waiting options. 18 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/OCTOBER 2003
APPENDIX: ON ESTIMATION OF CONSUMPTION GROWTH
SPECIFICATIONS
Appendix Figure 1 depicts the 68SNA series of one-year aggregate consumption
growth, both total and nondurable plus service, for the period between 1981 and
1999. Using these quarterly series, we estimate a typical consumption growth func-
tion. That is, one-year consumption growth is regressed on a level of a risk measure
and corresponding income growth with instrumental variables. A positive coefficient
on a risk measure is interpreted as evidence for precautionary savings (when risk
indexes are increasing in riskiness), while a positive coefficient on income growth is
interpreted as evidence for liquidity constraints. A major reason for using one-year
growth as a dependent variable is that frictional factors are expected to be weaker in
determining consumption profiles over one year.
Appendix Table 1 reports estimation results for both total and nondurable plus
service consumption. These results demonstrate that without any risk index, con-
sumption growth is statistically responsive to expected income growth, thereby
implying the presence of liquidity constraints. Once a risk index is included as an
explanatory variable, however, coefficients on expected income growth are no longer
significant in most cases, while coefficients on risk indexes are sometimes significant,
but their signs are opposite to the above theoretical implication.
These estimation patterns suggest that there is a strong multicolinearity between
expected income growth and the risk index used in this paper. In the presence of such
a multicolinearity, it is rather difficult to differentiate a precautionary saving motive
from liquidity constraints using the consumption growth specification with the risk
indexes used in this paper.








1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Changes from a year earlier, percent
Total consumption
Nondurable goods + service consumption
Source: Cabinet Office, National Accounts.19
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Appendix Table 1  Estimation Results of Consumption Growth Functions
68SNA household four-quarter consumption growth, seasonally non-adjusted; sample period: 1983/III–1999/I
Risk indexes
None UR AJOR NJOR CCI-all CCI(1) CCI(2) CCI(3) CCI(4) CCI(5)
[1] Total Consumption
Risk–1 —) –0.011 –0.001 –0.002 0.421** 0.481** 0.302** –0.112 0.092** 0.571***
(—) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.170) (0.237) (0.127) (0.089) (0.038) (0.162)
 4y 0.918** 0.088 1.081*** 1.167*** 0.149 0.152 0.108 0.526* 0.175 0.657
(0.418) (0.480) (0.335) (0.333) (0.373) (0.507) (0.348) (0.268) (0.343) (0.502)
OI test 7.564 7.338 6.923 6.486 4.864 5.508 5.193 9.295 6.186 2.853
[0.109] [0.197] [0.226] [0.262] [0.433] [0.357] [0.393] [0.098] [0.289] [0.723]
[2] Nondurable and Service Consumption
Risk–1 —) –0.009** 0.009 0.004 0.310*** 0.333*** 0.225*** –0.146* 0.087*** 0.240**
(—) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.119) (0.102) (0.066) (0.081) (0.034) (0.112)
 4y 0.918** 0.093 0.297 0.404 0.269 0.337 0.296 0.344** 0.278 0.471
(0.418) (0.244) (0.253) (0.254) (0.361) (0.392) (0.294) (0.171) (0.309) (0.314)
OI test 7.564 3.856 7.739 7.972 0.383 0.990 0.598 2.669 0.718 2.910
[0.109] [0.570] [0.171] [0.158] [0.996] [0.963] [0.988] [0.751] [0.982] [0.714]
Notes: 1. Estimation results are based on 2LS with the following instrumental variables: Risk –5, Risk–6,  4y–5,  4y–9, 
constant terms, and dummies.
2. Figures in parentheses are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, while symbols ***, **,
and * indicate that estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
3. The row labeled “OI test” reports test statistics of overidentifying restrictions, and their p-values in brackets.
4. The abbreviations of risk indexes indicate as follows: ratios of unemployed in the labor force as UR, active 
opening ratios as AJOR, new job openings to applicants ratio as NJOR, a consumer confidence index (overall
attitudes) as CCI-all, CCI (livelihoods) as CCI(1), CCI (increase in income) as CCI(2), CCI (decrease in consumer
price indexes) as CCI(3), CCI (employment environment) as CCI(4), and CCI (willingness to purchase durable
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